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HUGO PREUSS, GERMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
WEIMAR CONSTITUTION
Peter Stirk1
Abstract: The reputation of Hugo Preuss has been tainted by the failure of the
Weimar Republic, whose constitution he drafted. Preuss has consequently been com-
paratively neglected in the history of German political thought and some have seen
him as trapped in the conceptual world of the German monarchical state. This article
argues against that view of Preuss, and against the same view of Robert Redslob who
influenced him at a crucial stage. It also argues that Preuss had good democratic rea-
sons for advocating a directly elected president and that the later problems with the
German presidency were a product of subsequent reinterpretation of the role of the
president, which was contrary to Preuss’s intentions.
The reputation of Hugo Preuss has been bound up with the fate of the Weimar
Republic, whose constitution he drafted. Just as the Weimar Republic has
been seen as fundamentally flawed and doomed to failure, so too have the
ideas of Preuss. Central to the reputation of both Preuss and the Republic he
helped to found has been the position of the president of the Republic. In retro-
spect at least, the president, especially in the shape of Paul von Hindenburg,
readily appears as an ersatz Kaiser, and those who established the Republic
readily appear to have failed to make a decisive break with Germany’s author-
itarian past. In this, Preuss’s reputation has been further tainted by the fact that
he was influenced by Robert Redslob, whose book Parliamentary Govern-
ment in its True and Unauthentic Form has been regarded as trapped in the
authoritarian conceptual world of pre-1914 Germany. This picture of Preuss,
and Redslob, is not without some irony. In some sense it retrospectively con-
firms the views of the opponents of democratic and parliamentary govern-
ment in Germany who had fought hard to assert the ideas of 1914 as true
German virtues, against the ideas of 1789 and ‘Western’ political ideas in gen-
eral.2 They well knew that success in establishing a monochrome Germanic
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2 The ideas of 1914 were the supposedly Germanic virtues of national unity in con-
trast to the ideas of revolutionary France of 1789. The literature on this is subtantial. See
Hermann Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1974). For
an interesting argument see J. von Ungern-Sternberg’s claim that ‘ The modern peoples’
wars tend to become wars between good and evil, between the realm of light and dark-
ness. Confirmation of this can sadly be found with little effort up to the present day. But,
in the year 1914 the poets and thinkers stood completely unprepared for this. And they
reacted correspondingly. Their own self-images are in a high degree a mirror of the
foe’s.’ J. von Ungern-Sternberg, ‘Wie gibt man den Sinnlosen einen Sinn? Zum Gebrauch
der Begriffe “deutsche Kultur” und “Militarismus” im Herbst 1914’, Kultur und Krieg,
ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Munich, 1996), p. 88.
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tradition of political thought meant success in defeating their German politi-
cal opponents, who could then be disparaged as bearers of alien ideas. There is
further irony in the fact that the damning indictment of Preuss as a man
trapped in a tradition of authoritarian political thought was consolidated by a
genuine advocate of democracy, Ernst Fraenkel.
Yet it is wrong to force Preuss into the framework of a tradition marked by
the authoritarianism of the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine political systems. It
is inconsistent with his theoretical writings, his engagement as a practical pol-
itician, and his efforts to shape Germany’s constitutional future. Preuss, more-
over, had good democratic reasons for arguing as he did about the
constitutional position of the president in the Weimar Republic. The problem
was not the president’s role, as understood by Preuss and by the National
Assembly, which authorized the constitution, but subsequent interpretation of
the role, which was contrary to the spirit, and arguably the letter, of the consti-
tution.3
When Hugo Preuss was appointed State Secretary in the Ministry of the
Interior by the Council of People’s Commissars on 15 November 1918, with
the task of drafting what became the constitution of the Weimar Republic, he
already had behind him a substantial output as well as practical experience of
the politics of his native Berlin. He had become a Privatdozent in 1989, at the
age of only 29, on the basis of his habilitation thesis Community, State, Reich
as Territorial Corporations, a work heavily influenced by Otto Gierke’s
Genossenschaftstheorie.4 Further works followed, especially on the develop-
ment of communal law, including City Office Law in Prussia in 1902 and The
Constitutional Development of German Cities in 1906, as well as a host of
contributions to the journals of the day. Although the formulation of his argu-
ment varied, the underlying motive was consistent. Preuss sought to provide
an alternative to those theories that he believed led to the polarization of the
political community into an all-powerful monarch or despot on one side and
an impotent, disorganized populace on the other side. A favourite target was
the influence of private law on constitutional thought, which tended to reduce
the populace to the status of an object, in effect to the status of the property of
the state or monarch. Since organicist theories have often been associated
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3 See Jorg-Detlef Kühne, ‘Demokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Verfassungs-
diskussion — Hugo Preuss und die Nationalversammlung’, in Demokratisches Denken
in der Weimarer Republik, ed. Christopher Gusy (Baden-Baden, 2000), p. 125. For
recent surveys of Weimar see, Weimar und die Deutsche Verfassung, ed. Andreas
Rödder (Stuttgart, 1999); and especially Detlef Lehnert, Die Weimarer Republik
(Stuttgart, 1999).
4 Hugo Preuss, Gemeinde, Staat Reich als Gebietskörperschaften (Berlin, 1889) was
dedicated to Gierke. The Habilitationsschrift was a post-doctoral thesis that qualified
someone for the position of Privatdozent. A Privatdozent had limited remuneration,
security and influence. For details see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston,
1973), pp. 6–7.
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with authoritarian or pseudo-democratic trends, it is worth noting that Preuss
had no intention of replacing the tyranny of a monarch with the tyranny of a
common will. Thus he specified that ‘The differentiation of the legally
normativized and organized expression of the common will through a plural-
ity of organs is, in contrast to the absolute state, the conceptual essence of the
constitutional Rechtsstaat.’5 It is true that Preuss often had difficulty clarify-
ing the organicist standpoint. He retreated from the attempt to enlist the natu-
ral sciences only to take refuge in the notion that none of the sciences could
fully grasp the great puzzle of organic development. Georg Jellinek rightly
pounced on both strategies.6 Yet the underlying intent is clear and consistent.
Preuss fought to establish the idea of a pluralist, constitutionally consolidated,
society.
Despite Preuss’s extensive publications he was denied a professorship at
an established university. Here his Jewish ancestry as well as his radicalism
hindered his career and he settled for a professorship at the Berlin
Handelshochschule in 1906.7 A few years later his services to Berlin city poli-
tics were acknowledged when he was elected an honorary member of the
magistracy.8 It was his experience of Berlin politics that mitigated his initial
hostility to socialism. Indeed, looking back on this he took pride in having
been ‘more anti-capitalist’ than the social democrats.9 By the time he was
appointed to the Reich Ministry of the Interior he was well known not only as
an advocate of municipal socialism but also as a tireless critic of the
Obrigkeitsstaat (authoritarian state), a term he himself coined.10 Despite his
5 Hugo Preuss, ‘Über Organpersönlichkeit’, Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung
und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 26 (1902), p. 135.
6 For the attempt to enlist the natural sciences see, for example, Hugo Preuss,
‘Entwicklung und Bedeutung des öffentlichen Rechts’, Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung,
Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 13 (1889), pp. 108–9; for the puz-
zle see Preuss, ‘Über Organpersönlichkeit’, p. 121; for Jellinek’s criticism see Georg
Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin, 1922), pp. 151–4. Constraints of space prevent
any more than an indication of Preuss’s theoretical position.
7 The Handelshochschulen or commercial colleges enjoyed lower status than estab-
lished universities.
8 Dian Schefold, ‘Hugo Preuss (1860–1925)’, in Deutsche Juristen jüdischer
Herkunft, ed. H.C. Helmut Heinrichs et al. (Munich, 1993), p. 432. Preuss had first been
elected a deputy of the city assembly in 1895. For biographical information in English see
Ernest Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuss: Scholar and Statesman’, Leo Baeck Institute Year-
book, 20 (London, 1975), pp. 179–206.
9 This was in 1911. Quoted in Detlef Lehnert, Verfassungsdemokratie als Büger-
genossenschaft (Baden-Baden, 1998), p. 243.
10 The Obrigkeitsstaat was contrasted with the Volksstaat, though Preuss was not as
strongly attached to the latter term as to the former. Although the Obrigkeitsstaat had an
extensive set of characteristics, he tried to simplify the contrast as follows: ‘One can, dis-
regarding all constitutional paragraphs and legal-political forms, formulate the matter
thus: is the political leadership and are political leaders selected and determined by a
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boast about his anti-capitalism Preuss was a bourgeois liberal who, the day
before his appointment, warned the Socialists against introducing an inverted
Obrigkeitsstaat.11 Indeed his liberal credentials, as well as his expertise, an
expertise notably lacking in the ranks of the Socialists, may well have recom-
mended him to the socialist leaders. Walter Jellinek, for one, presumed that
Friedrich Ebert saw Preuss not just as a radical democrat and jurist but also as
a bridge to the liberal camp in Germany.12 Until his appointment to the Minis-
try of the Interior his practical engagement in politics mirrored his more theo-
retical work, for he had linked the beginning of the break with the absolutist
state in Germany with the development of communal self-administration.13
As a theorist, radical democrat, liberal, and above all as the prime architect
of the Weimar constitution, Preuss would seem to be a natural candidate for a
prominent place in the history of German political thought.14 Yet those who
have commented on him have frequently had cause to complain that Preuss
has not received the attention he is due. Over forty years ago Ernst Maste
noted the discrepancy between Preuss’s role and the literature devoted to
him.15 More recently Detlef Lehnert has written a substantial volume about
Preuss, part of which attempts to explain why Preuss’s reputation seems to
have been the victim of a widespread ‘loss of memory’. He notes the irony that
the educational work of the FDP is conducted under the name of Friedrich
Naumann, whose sympathy for Max Weber’s power politics makes him a far
less probable symbol for modern German liberalism than the comparatively
neglected Preuss.16
It is also striking that even recent assessments of Preuss differ quite
sharply. Detlef Lehnert argues throughout his volume for an interpretation of
Preuss that emphasizes his modernity, his thorough break with authoritarian
traditions in Germany, and his importance to the liberal, pluralistic, tradition
500 P. STIRK
strong public opinion or by a self-contained elite [einer in sich selbst ruhenden
Obrigkeit]?’, Hugo Preuss, ‘Weltkrieg, Demokratie und Deutschlands Erneuerung’,
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 44 (1917), pp. 252–3.
11 Hugo Preuss, ‘Volksstaat oder verkehrte Obrigkeitsstaat’, in Hugo Preuss, Staat,
Recht und Freiheit (Tübingen, 1926), pp. 365–8.
12 Walter Jellinek, ‘Insbesondere: Entstehung und Ausbau der Weimarer
Reichsverfassung’, in Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. Gerhard Anschütz and
Richard Thoma (Tübingen, 1930), Vol. 1, p. 127.
13 Preuss, ‘Über Organpersönlichkeit’, p. 135.
14 It even seemed so to Carl Schmitt; see C. Schmitt, Hugo Preuss. Sein Staatsbegriff
und seine Stellung in der Deutschen Staatslehre (Tübingen, 1930).
15 Ernst Maste, ‘Hugo Preuss. Vater der Weimarer Verfassung’, Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, 43 (1960), p. 696.
16 Lehnert, Verfassungsdemokratie als Bügergenossenschaft, pp. 46–7. Part three of
the book is devoted to explaining the obstacles to the reception of Preuss, pp. 316–475.
See also Lehnert’s ‘Hugo Preuss als moderner Klassiker einer kritischen Theorie der
“verfassten” Politik’, Politische Vierteljahrschrift, 33 (1992), pp. 33–54: ‘Preuss has not
even received a reception worth naming in his own land’, p. 33.
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of political thought. In a survey of Imperial and Weimar Germany, Peter Lan-
dau notes simply that Preuss ‘can be characterized as the first German theorist
of democracy in the twentieth century’.17 Others have been less charitable. In
the same volume in which Landau praises Preuss, Dian Schefold concludes
that he can be seen as ‘a founder of modern pluralist theory’, but casts doubt
upon his grasp of the role of political parties. Moreover his constitutional
writings were, according to Schefold, ‘oriented toward the monarchic state’.18
The idea that Preuss remained trapped in the conceptual world of Wilhelmine
Germany is much more strongly emphasized by Christoph Schönberger, who
accepts that Preuss was a critic of authoritarian government but denies that he
counts as a ‘theorist of the organization and control of democratic authority
[Herrschaft]’.19 It is notable that Schönberger becomes more scathing when
he discusses the relationship between Preuss’s constitutional drafts and the
work of Robert Redslob. As noted above, Redslob was the author of Parlia-
mentary Government in its True and Unauthentic Form, which appeared in
1918. In the early years of the Weimar Republic it was widely accepted that
Redslob’s book had had a significant impact upon Preuss.20 More specifically
it was accepted that this book had encouraged Preuss to argue for a president
as head of state, and for a president directly elected by the populace. Later it
was common to see Max Weber’s influence behind Preuss’s advocacy of the
directly elected president, until Wolfgang J. Mommsen reasserted the role of
Redslob.21
Both Schönberger and Mommsen refer to the judgment of Ernst Fraenkel
on Redslob’s influence and especially Redslob’s interpretation of the English
political system, that is, the ‘true’ form of parliamentary government in his
title, and the French political system, the ‘ungenuine’ form of parliamentary
government. Fraenkel’s comments are so scathing that they are worth quoting
at length:
Robert Redslob is responsible for the fact that in 1918 not the English con-
stitution, but the glosses which French monarchists wrote about it, were
taken up. The incorporation of the doctrine of the ‘genuine parliamentary
17 Peter Landau, ‘Juristen jüdischer Herkunft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer
Republik’, in Deutsche Juristen jüdischer Herkunft, ed. Heinrichs et al., p. 179.
18 Dian Schefold, ‘Hugo Preuss (1860–1925)’, in Deutsche Juristen jüdischer
Herkunft, ed. Heinrichs et al., p. 450.
19 Christoph Schönberger, Das Parlament in Anstaltsstaat. Zur Theorie
parlamentarischer Repräsentation in der Staatsrechtslehre des Kaiserreichs 1871–1918
(Frankfurt am Main, 1997), p. 403.
20 For a list of sources see ibid., p. 384.
21 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920 (Chicago,
1984), pp. 348–53. See also Ernst Portner, Die Verfassungspolitik der Liberalen 1919
(Bonn, 1973), p. 137, and the earlier work by Günther Gillessen, Hugo Preuss. Studien
zur Ideen- und Verfassungsgechichte der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 2000), p. 111.
Gillessen’s work was completed in 1955.
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government’ in the Weimar constitution resulted in the hypertrophy of the
plebiscitarian component in the governmental system of the first Republic.
It corresponded to vulgar-democratic undertones which were active on the
left and anti-democratic undertones on the right. It set out from a unified
popular will and was therefore incompatible with the structure of the Ger-
man party system, which reflected the pluralist character of German soci-
ety. It led to a discrediting of political parties and indirectly to the shattering
of the authority of parliament. It insinuated at the same time the existence of
a party government and a Reich President ‘standing above parties’. Since
the Weimar constitution avoided an answer to the question whether the
Republic was supposed to be a party state, it induced a kind of political
schizophrenia. The Weimar Republic suffered from a defect of birth, on
which it ran aground.22
Although Fraenkel’s work was a broad survey of the development of ideas
of democracy, the vehemence of his judgment reflects the experience of
Weimar. The plebiscitarian approach, often overtly appealing to Rousseau,
saw democracy as an expression only of the unified common will. Underlying
this was the demand for social homogeneity as a precondition of true democ-
racy. From this perspective the assumption of social plurality and the diversity
of interests in the model of representative government appeared as ‘disruptive
factors’.23 In the hands of Carl Schmitt the assumption of social, and indeed
ethnic, homogeneity was employed in the name of democracy against the lib-
eral representative system.24 Ideas of social homogeneity also appealed to
those on the left of Weimar politics, for example to Otto Kirchheimer,
although he soon saw the potential consequences of a Rousseauian approach
to modern democratic systems. The complexity of Weimar political thought,
the difficulty in clearly identifying democratic and non-democratic positions,
explains the clarity of Fraenkel’s distinction and the vigour of his judgment.25
This indictment is reflected in Schönberger’s criticism of the character of
the broader debate: ‘It was a genuinely German mixture of the independent
political role of the head of state, traditional government by civil servants
[Beamtenregierung] and a direct-democracy conception of democracy, which
is also recognisable in Preuss.’26 Both Fraenkel, in indictment of Redslob, and
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22 Ernst Fraenkel, Die repräsentative und die plebiszitäre Komponente im
demokratischen Verfassungsstaat (Tübingen, 1958), p. 55. For the continuing influence
of Fraenkel’s contrast see Werner J. Patzelt, ‘Verdrossen sind die Ahnungslosen’, Die
Zeit (22 February 2001).
23 Fraenkel, Die repräsentative und die plebiszitäre Komponente im demokratischen
Verfassungsstaat, p. 7.
24 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge, MA, 1985).
25 On Kirchheimer see William E. Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception
(Cambridge, MA, 1994), and the essays in The Rule of Law under Siege, ed. William E.
Scheuerman (Berkeley, 1996). On the difficulty see Christoph Gusy, ‘Einleitung’, in
Demokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, ed. Gusy, pp. 12–13.
26 Schönberger, Das Parlament in Anstaltsstaat, p. 394.
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Schönberger, in allusion to Preuss, provide a catalogue of the intellectual bar-
riers to a viable democratic and parliamentary government in Weimar Ger-
many. There was oscillation between outright hostility to democracy and the
invocation of a pure form of democracy, with the latter sometimes used to
undermine the credibility of parliamentary government. There was the sys-
tematic misunderstanding of the English political system, either wilfully or
because it was seen through the distorting lens of German or, in the case of
Fraenkel’s argument, French monarchism. There was, finally, the idea of
some political instance that would stand above political parties, which Gustav
Radbruch called the ‘life-giving lie’ of the authoritarian state.27
Both Preuss and Redslob, then, stand accused of failing to break through
the conceptual world of the authoritarian state, despite Preuss’s long-standing
criticism of the Obrigkeitsstaat and Redslob’s praise of the ‘true’ parliamen-
tary government of England. Though their ideas intersected only briefly,
amidst the pressure of Preuss’s work on the draft constitution to tight dead-
lines and amidst political turmoil, the reputation of both has been tainted by
that brief period in German history, and even more so by the fate of the
Weimar Republic.
Before turning to the content and influence of Redslob’s book, it is worth
making two points. The first is that Preuss was never attracted by the
Rousseauian model. In an early work, he described Rousseau as an ‘unre-
strained visionary [Schwärmer]’ and dismissed his opposition to representa-
tive government as a product of his ‘sentimental radicalism’, which was of
little practical value.28 ‘Rousseau’s spirit’, he wrote, ‘ruled in the later orgies
of political madness; it animated the sentimental butcher Robespierre.’29 As
Detlef Lehnert has recently emphasized, Preuss had not changed his stance in
his final reflections on the Weimar Republic: Rousseau was not a guide for the
modern world.30 The second point is that while neither Preuss nor Redslob
was in thrall to an authoritarian political tradition, they were indeed respond-
ing to the concerns of their day and the history of their society. Especially in
terms of identifying the problems they saw themselves confronted with, they
were very much shaped by the history of their own society. There is a broader
point here. Constructing traditions in the history of political thought is always
problematic, and it is always a case of constructing them. Given the troubled
history of Germany in the last century, it is not difficult to see that the general
27 ‘The government above parties was precisely the legend, the life-giving lie
[Lebenslüge] of the authoritarian state [Obrigkeitsstaat]’, Gustav Radbruch, ‘Die
politischen Parteien im System des deutschen Verfassungsrechts’, in Handbuch des
Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. Anschütz and Thoma, Vol. 1, p. 289.
28 Preuss, ‘Entwicklung und Bedeutung des öffentlichen Rechts’, pp. 106–7.
29 Ibid., p. 106.
30 Detlef Lehnert, ‘Der Beitrag von Hans Kelsen und Hugo Preuss zum modernen
Demokratieverständnis’, in Demokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, ed.
Gusy, pp. 238–9.
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problem becomes quite acute here. Moreover, traditions, whether positively
or negatively evaluated, can have a constricting effect, either forcing ideas
into the national tradition or expelling them as alien. But while both Preuss
and Redslob were shaped by German political traditions in the way they iden-
tified the problems of their day, they were open to other political traditions in
seeking answers to those problems.31
According to Schönberger, Redslob had intended Die parlamentarische
Regierung to be a contribution to the debate about the deficiencies of the
French parliamentary system, and had intended to publish it in French.32 Only
the prolongation of the war induced him to publish it in German in 1918. Be
that as it may, the English political system was clearly identified as the model
of ‘true’ parliamentary government. Again according to Schönberger, in
Redslob’s book the secret of the English system lay in the balance between
parliament and government, each of which tended to encroach on the other.
Where such encroachment led to irresolvable conflict, the solution lay in the
dissolution of parliament, which in turn meant an appeal to the people as the
arbitrator. The right to dissolve parliament supposedly lay with the monarch.
Although Schönberger rightly notes that Redslob is far from unambiguous, he
concludes that Redslob ‘appears to be much more concerned about the confor-
mity of parliament and the “true people’s will” than about the balance
between parliament and government, so emphasized by himself’.33 The impli-
cation is clear. Redslob saw the English political system through Rousseauian
eyes.34 Worse still, Redslob, drawing in reality on Benjamin Constant’s notion
of the monarch as the ‘pouvoir neutre’, grossly exaggerated the power of the
504 P. STIRK
31 Preuss also invoked Germanic traditions of law, against, for example, Roman law,
in arguing for this Genossenschaftstheorie, without ceasing to praise England. See
Preuss, Gemeinde, Staat Reich als Gebietskörperschaften. One tradition’s solution could
also be another’s problem. See Preuss’s observation about the adoption of the trappings
of the absolutist state in a fragmented Germany: ‘This tragicomic caricature of the abso-
lute monarchy often worked out grotesquely enough when some small dynast, in the pur-
ple of byzantine majesty, strutted about as the successor of the caesars and later imitated
the l’état c’est moi of the sun king with unbelievable seriousness.’ Hugo Preuss, Die
Entwicklung des deutschen Städtewesens (Leipzig, 1906), p. 126. The German case is
further complicated by the fact that, for younger theorists at least, the experience of emi-
gration meant that they contributed to other traditions as much as to the German political
tradition.
32 ‘Redslob had originally written it [his book] in no sense in relation to the German
situation.’ Schönberger, Das Parlament in Anstaltsstaat, p. 388. Yet, as explained below,
its relevance to German concerns is inescapable.
33 Ibid., p. 390.
34 According to Winfried Steffani, an enduring obstacle to German understanding
of British parliamentary government has been the fact that ‘one sought to link parlia-
mentary institutions, whose model had been developed in Great Britain, with a
Rousseauian-radical understanding of democracy stemming from France’. W. Steffani,
‘Das parlamentarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland heute’, Zeitschrift für Parlaments-
fragen, 16 (1985), p. 220.
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English monarch: ‘The conception that the English king could bring about the
fall of a government commanding a parliamentary majority is, however, at the
time of the publication of Redslob’s book, highly anachronistic.’35 Again the
implication is clear: Redslob contributed to the search for a ‘substitute Kai-
ser’, who was found in the president of the Republic, who eventually contrib-
uted so much to its demise.
There are three general points about assessments of Redslob’s argument
that should be noted. First, many of the misinterpretations of which Redslob
has been accused were endemic. The exaggeration of the power of the monar-
chy went back at least to the highly influential Rudolf von Gneist and proved
difficult to shake off.36 Yet monarchists in Germany were quite capable of
emphasizing the weakness of the English monarch to the point where they
spoke of England’s crypto-republicanism, thereby, of course, intending to
discredit England’s status as a model for constitutional reform in Germany.
Misunderstanding may have abounded, but there was no simple correlation
between German domestic positions and the perception of England. Second,
one of the common, and again enduring, assumptions was that the interval
between the two great reforms of 1832 and 1867 in England was the golden
age of parliamentary sovereignty. Thereafter, the extension of the suffrage,
the growth of the party machine, and the rule of the whips in parliament sup-
posedly undermined parliamentary sovereignty in all but name. Again this
was compatible with a range of evaluations. It could be treated, for example,
as a genuine lament or as a mock lament, behind which lay the implication that
parliamentary government was obsolete even in the land of its birth.37 In some
respects Redslob shared this general assumption but he was also capable, at
least implicitly, of distinguishing between parliamentary sovereignty and a
‘parliamentary regime’. From this perspective the situation between 1832 and
35 Schönberger, Das Parlament in Anstaltsstaat, p. 388. He lists several authors who
criticized the anachronism of Redslob’s account, from Wilhelm Hassbach in 1919
through to Fraenkel.
36 On Gneist see the judgment of Reinhard J. Lammer: ‘The Prussian sense of the
state and the Prussian-monarchist tradition are so deeply rooted in Gneist’s entire con-
ceptual world that he could only look for the dynamic force of English constitutional
development in the monarchy . . .’. R.J. Lammer, Der englische Parlamentarismus in der
deutschen politische Theorie im Zeitalter Bismarcks (1857–1890) (Lübeck, 1963),
p. 115. In the interwar period there was a tendency to emphasize the monarch’s ‘latent’
and ‘social’ authority. See Otto Koellreutter, Der englische Staat der Gegenwart und das
britische Weltreich (Breslau, 1930), pp. 27–8.
37 For the persistence of the image and the diversity of conclusions see Adolf M. Birke,
‘Die Souveranität des viktorianischen Parlaments und die moderne Parlamentarismus-
kritik’, in A.M. Birke, Deutschland und Grossbritanien. Historische Beziehungen und
Vergleiche (Munich, 1999), pp. 19–31. Birke’s own judgment is that ‘it is not only con-
temporary voices which led to the conclusion that the early Victorian Parliament was a
transitional formation which must be seen rather as untypical for the parliamentary mode
of government’, ibid., p. 31.
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1867 was an ‘incomplete parliamentary regime’.38 Redslob pointed to the
increased importance of the hustings, as opposed to parliament, as the settings
for the great speeches of the day, to party discipline and ‘subjection to the
machine’, to ministerial resignation after a lost election but before parliament
met, to the increasing tendency to seek an electoral mandate for important leg-
islation; but all this formed part of the development of the ‘parliamentary
regime’.39 Third, Redslob was accused of dogmatism. Yet despite the force-
fulness of some, and only some, of his claims and definitions, this is difficult
to reconcile with, for example, his treatment of Belgium. Belgium posed a
problem because it had a bicameral system but one in which the power of the
senate had not been curbed in the way that the power of the English House of
Lords had. This could have presented a problem as ministers sought to satisfy
two legislative masters. However, Redslob argued that the Belgians had found
a way out, not by constitutional revision but by tradition. The Senate simply
exercised restraint. Redslob concluded: ‘Belgium lives under a parliamentary
regime like Great Britain.’40
This in fact points to the prime attraction of the parliamentary regime for
Redslob. He wrote repeatedly about it as a ‘mechanism’, as an ‘artificial sys-
tem of wheels [Räderwerke]’ that kept the English constitutional system mov-
ing.41 It was this that prevented what Redslob most feared: constitutional and
governmental paralysis. Indeed, so enamoured was he of this, that he turned it
into the effective definition of a parliamentary regime: ‘For in parliamentary
regimes there is no conflict without a solution. It never happens that two
organs neutralize each other or condemn each other to inactivity because no
agreement is reached. The reason is that there is always a highest arbiter: the
people.’42 The appeal to the people, of course, took place through the dissolu-
tion of parliament.
In France, however, it was different. According to Redslob, ‘There is no
right of dissolution in France . . . The appeal to the people is impossible.’43
Moreover, he ascribed this impossibility to the weakness of the president, to
the lack of balance between president and assembly. It is here that his critics
see the origins of advocacy of a strong, Weimar, president, equipped with the
right of dissolution, who was supposed to provide a counterweight to parlia-
ment but ended by undermining it on the basis of his claim, by virtue of his
direct election, to more properly represent the general will of the people.
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38 Robert Redslob, Die parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und in ihrer
unechten Form (Tübingen, 1918), p. 26.
39 Ibid., pp. 35–40.
40 Ibid., p. 81. He was also content to account for differences between the English and
French in the nebulous terms of ‘national psychology’, ibid., pp. 181, 183, 185.
41 Ibid., p. 4.
42 Ibid., p. 59.
43 Ibid., p. 120.
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Before considering how sound this deduction is, it is worth asking why
Redslob was so concerned about the possibility of governmental and constitu-
tional paralysis. Here, Schönberger is clearly right: the answer lies, in part, in
Redslob’s contribution to a French debate. There is another answer, one that
haunted German constitutionalists: that is, the constitutional conflict in Prus-
sia between 1862 and 1866. Here was the archetypal failure of two organs to
agree, with no mechanism or system of wheels to resolve it. The impact of this
conflict is difficult to exaggerate. It arose because of the refusal of the Prus-
sian Landtag to approve increased military expenditure. The newly appointed
prime minister, Otto von Bismarck, proclaimed that there was a ‘gap’ in the
constitution and relied upon a supposedly more original authority of the state
to continue collecting taxes and running the government. The conflict was
resolved in the wake of Prussian victories in 1866 when an Indemnification
Bill retrospectively sanctioned Bismarck’s action and split the liberals in the
process. While those on the left have tended to see this as a triumph of the
nationalist power state over political liberalism, those on the right were not
necessarily reassured. Carl Schmitt, who saw the crisis as the ‘central event’
of the century, saw the resolution of the crisis as an unsatisfactory attempt to
evade the real decision about the future of the German state.44 The highly
influential jurist, Laband, saw Bismarck’s proclamation of a ‘gap’ in the con-
stitution as a threat to the science of law, to which he devoted his life. He
denied that there could be any such gap and indulged in considerable leger-
demain to prove the point, while with greater distance Georg Jellinek
lamented ‘How much useless effort have people given themselves to prove
that the budget-less economy in Prussia in 1862–66 was legal, at least to a cer-
tain degree!’45 Here is the German problem to which Redslob had found an
English political solution.
What stands out in Redslob’s book is the quasi-automatic generation of the
solution, the operation of his ‘system of wheels’. It is true that he saw France’s
weakness arising from the weakness of its president and even that he cast
doubt on the ability of republics in general to develop a ‘true’ parliamentary
regime.46 It is true that he exaggerated the residual powers of the English
44 Hans-Christof Kraus, ‘Ursprung und Genese der “Lückentheorie” im preussischen
Verfassungskonflikt’, Der Staat, 38 (1990), p. 209; and E.W. Böckenförde, ‘Der
Deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. Jahrhundert’, in
E.W. Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), pp. 275–6.
45 For an excellent summary of the crisis and Laband’s solution see Peter Caldwell,
Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law (London, 1997),
pp. 16–25. The infamous ‘gap’ theory predated the crisis; see Kraus, ‘Ursprung und
Genese der “Lückentheorie” im pruessischen Verfassungskonflikt’, pp. 209–34. For
Jellinek’s lament see his Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 359.
46 ‘And so we come to the conclusion that the parliamentary republic is not, by
its nature, an illogical phenomenon, is not a contradiction in itself.’ Redslob, Die
parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und in ihrer unechten Form, p. 184.
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monarch, though here he was, as he often was, equivocal. On the one hand he
wrote that ‘the head of state in a parliamentary regime is only free in the hour
in which he chooses the government’. Yet he denied that the monarch was a
mere figurehead, though he agreed that he could make use of his powers only
‘in the case of most extreme danger’.47 However, this does not prove that he
favoured a directly elected president equipped with the power of dissolution,
and much more beside, able to see himself as the incarnation of the general
will.48
There are indeed indications that this is not what he envisaged. Redslob was
rather sceptical, at best, about the Rousseauian notion of the general will. He
described it as a ‘dogma’, albeit one deeply rooted in the French mind, as
France’s two emperors had known all too well. For himself, however, it was
not necessary ‘to personify the people’ as some ‘kind of person capable of
action like a human being’.49 The French, he noted, had experimented with
various mechanisms for constituting and selecting an executive. In terms of
both political theory and empirical experience it had proved difficult to decide
between the competing arguments. But Redslob continued, ‘Soon the proph-
esies of those who recognized the danger of an executive produced by a plebi-
scite fulfilled themselves. The coup d’état of 2 December 1851 proved them
right.’50 He promptly added that the French had then swung to the opposite
extreme, but that does not detract from his basic awareness of the dangers of
an elected head of state. Indeed that was one of the reasons for his sympathy
for monarchy. Redslob was also aware of the potential abuse of the right of
dissolution, which he held to be so important. Despite his bald assertion that
there was no right of dissolution in France, this was not strictly true, as he well
knew. President Mac-Mahon had dissolved parliament in 1877 and Redslob
even emphasized that this was perfectly legal. It was, however, in this case,
quite contrary to the spirit of the constitution. Redslob went to considerable
lengths to emphasize his distaste for Mac-Mahon’s action. Dissolution, he
wrote, ‘may not be used in order to break resistance and help a policy to vic-
tory . . . Dissolution is no kind of weapon of attack. It is a question, perhaps a
plea, but it is no kind of coup de main . . . To appeal to a people, whose
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47 Ibid., pp. 6, 40–50.
48 Thus Karl Loewenstein agreed with Redslob for whom, he wrote, ‘the prerogative
of the electors . . . is the expression for the locus of political power’, and criticized
Koellreutter for putting the ‘existence of an independent instance for dissolution and the
regulation of plebiscites too much in the foreground’. Karl Loewenstein, ‘Zur Soziologie
der parlamentarischen Repräsentation in England nach der grossen Reform. Die Zeitalter
der Parlamentssouveranität (1832–1867)’, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik, 51 (1924), p. 763.
49 Redslob, Die parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und in ihrer unechten
Form, p. 118.
50 Ibid., p. 114.
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opposition one knows, means pursuing an act of repression, means not recog-
nizing a people as a judge and degrading it to the roll of an instrument . . .’.51
Schönberger writes that ‘it is interesting to see how Redslob assessed the
reception of his own theory in Germany’, and then continues to quote two
long passages from The Parliamentary Regime of 1924. These warn against
the excessive powers of the president of the Weimar Republic, especially the
power to put a parliamentary law to a referendum, and against the possibility
of a development of the ‘predominance of the executive, which rests on the
support of the people’.52 For Schönberger this warning is all the more striking
because it came from the pen of the author of the theory of ‘genuine
parliamentarianism’.53 It is, however, quite consistent with Redslob’s book of
1918. He had clearly recognized, and warned against, excessive power, espe-
cially in the hands of a plebiscitarian executive, and the misuse of legitimate
power. It is worth adding that Redslob also argued for the importance of polit-
ical parties and for an opposition party capable of taking over the government
of the country. If anything, he can be accused of idealizing his English model
when he wrote that in England, in contrast to France, ‘If a crisis breaks out, the
leaders of the other party are ready to take over. The new government is
already formed; it is like a completely constructed set of wheels that was until
now immobile and only needs to be set in motion in order to function with pre-
cision.’54
Redslob’s account of his model England is not without its defects, and his
sympathy for monarchy is evident. Both indeed are tied to his admiration for
the ‘system of wheels’, which, albeit not without friction, had driven forward
English constitutional development, avoiding the perils of paralysis to which
the French, and surely also the German, state had succumbed. He was also
pragmatic and well aware of the problems of plebiscitarian legitimation of a
powerful executive. It is here that Preuss might have taken heed of Redslob’s
51 Ibid., p. 132. Mommsen notes, ‘Redslob argued that dissolution was not an offen-
sive weapon’, but continues: ‘But was it not, for all that, the major weapon of the consti-
tutional monarch in his struggle against a recalcitrant parliament?’, Mommsen, Max
Weber and German Politics, p. 350. It was, as Redslob well knew, especially in Ger-
many: ‘Thus the dissolution in Germany is no appeal to the people as the arbiter of a con-
flict, but a weapon in order to break the resistance of the lower house.’ Redslob, Die
parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und in ihrer unechten Form, pp. 99–100.
Redslob’s point was that this was a misuse of the power of dissolution, as is clear from his
comments on Mac-Mahon.
52 Schönberger, Das Parlament in Anstaltsstaat, pp. 399–400. Redslob had already
issued the same warning, in the same words, the previous year. See Robert Redslob, ‘Le
régime parlementaire en Allemagne’, Revue du droit public, 40 (1923), pp. 533, 535.
53 Schönberger, Das Parlament in Anstaltstaat, p. 400.
54 Redslob, Die parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und in ihrer unechten
Form, p. 140. See also his emphasis on parties and the ‘policy of the majority’ in judging
Sweden, p. 104.
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warnings or indeed the warnings of others.55 Yet that does not mean that
Preuss was trapped in the conceptual world of the authoritarian state, that his
constitutional writing was oriented towards the monarchical state or the rule
of officials standing above party conflict.
From the outset Preuss was a tireless critic of the fixation of the German
theory of the state on monarchical power. In his Community, State, Reich as
Territorial Corporations he complained that ‘The German science of politics
[Staatsrechtswissenschaft] has . . . long born traits that go together with its ori-
gins in the era of the absolutist princely states. So the starting point of all these
reflections is . . . the union of personal and territorial power in the princely
right of domination.’56 It was precisely against these traits that Preuss set his
Genossenschaftstheorie. For all his references to the ‘old-Germanic’ origins
of this theory, he was scornful of the contemporary inclination to conjure up
images of the medieval estates against the reality of modern-day politics. He
explicitly defended the professional politicians, the modern parliamentarians
who had so irritated Bismarck. These were the men who ‘acted in parliament
not just in a dilettantish fashion here and there but have dedicated their lives to
this vocation; in brief the now so reviled, so called “vocational parliamentar-
ians” [Berufsparlamentarier]’.57 He had only contempt for the rhetoric of the
stance above party politics and the disparagement of political motives, which
he found on both the right and the left. Indeed even when he had become quite
well-disposed towards Germany’s socialists he complained of their attitude
towards politics, an attitude he ascribed to their German nationality rather
than their socialist doctrine. Thus, he wrote, ‘The dogmatic one-sidedness of
the materialist conception of history with its underestimation of purely politi-
cal motives marks out Marx and Engels more strongly as Germans than as
social democrats.’58 Similarly, in an article published in 1912, he was highly
critical of claims that administrative reform in Austria and Prussia could be
carried out without touching the framework of the state. He noted, moreover,
that he had always insisted that administrative reform and politics were
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55 See Hans Fenske, ‘Nichtamtliche Verfassungsentwürfe 1918/19’, Archiv des
öffentlichen Rechts, 121 (1996), pp. 24–58. Fenske himself concludes that a more clear-
cut presidential system would have been better. See also Heinrich Potthoff, ‘Das Weimarer
Verfassungswerk und die deutsche Linke’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 12 (1972),
pp. 433–83. Potthoff notes (p. 457) that even those suspicious of presidential power ini-
tially failed to see any problem with Article 48.
56 Preuss, Gemeinde, Staat Reich als Gebietskörperschaften, p. 287.
57 Hugo Preuss, ‘Deutschland und sein Reichskanzler gegenüber dem Geist unserer
Zeit’, Deutsche Zeit- und Streit Fragen, 14 (1885), p. 36.
58 Hugo Preuss, ‘Weltkrieg, Demokratie und Deutschland Erneuerung’, Archiv für
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 44 (1917), pp. 256–7. See also his comment:
‘Strange that one believes it necessary to continually warn the most unpolitical of all cul-
tural nations of the enchantress, politics . . .’, Hugo Preuss,‘Verwaltungsreform und
Poltik’, Zeitschrift für Politik, 1 (1907), p. 96.
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linked.59 There is little room here for the notion that some institution or person
could stand above the political fray.
Why, then, did Preuss subsequently argue for a powerful head of state
equipped with the right of dissolution and much else besides, and why did he
justify this in Redslob’s language of ‘genuine parliamentarianism’? Was
Preuss, who was also an admirer of the British political system, drawing on
the model of the British monarchy? In one sense the answer is no. It was not
the British monarch that occupied pride of place in Preuss’s frequent invoca-
tion of England as a model. Indeed, more generally, he held the choice
between monarchy and republicanism to be a secondary issue, for, he argued,
was there not more difference between monarchical England and monarchical
Russia than between monarchical England and Republican America?60 What
recurred in Preuss’s invocation of England was the close link between local
and national self-government, the historical evolution of which had fostered a
common sense of citizenship. That ‘communal self-government’ was the
basis, and parliamentary government the capstone, of the English system was,
he wrote, ‘a commonplace of German science’.61
When Preuss joined the debate on constitutional reform during the war
years, the English model was still in evidence, though on occasion he was
more inclined to contrast German and Austrian forms of government with
those of the remainder of ‘Euro-American’ culture.62 He was also concerned
with specific German problems of constitutional reform. Prominent here was
the arcane nature of the German Reich, above all the half-concealed hege-
mony of Prussia. It was this that led to his suggestion for a revision to Article 5
of the constitution. His revision specified that the consent of the Kaiser,
Reichstag and Reichsrat should be required for legislation, whereas the exist-
ing article made no reference to the Kaiser. This was only an apparent increase
in power for the Kaiser, for, Preuss explained, ‘the Kaiser in reality has an
59 Hugo Preuss, ‘Verwaltungsreform und Staatsreform in Österreich und Preussen’,
Zeitschrift für Politik, 5 (1912), pp. 215–35.
60 Hugo Preuss, ‘Sozialismus und Konstitutionalismus’ [1903], in Preuss, Staat,
Recht und Freiheit, p. 244. See also his comments on Kant’s conception of a republican
constitution: Hugo Preuss, ‘Nationaler Gegensatz und internationaler Gemeinschaft’
[1918], in ibid., p. 353.
61 Preuss, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Städtewesens, p. 235. In this text he rejected
France as a model precisely because of its deficient local self-government. Prussia, with
elements of local self-government but without a parliamentary constitution, was like a
house without a roof (ibid., p. 278). Preuss was however highly critical of the supposed
link between monarchism and national unity in German history. This, he wrote, ‘was a
strange inversion of national values. The monarchical dynasties, whose history was the
history of political fragmentation of Germany, as the bearers of the idea of national
unity!’. Hugo Preuss, ‘Republik oder Monarchie? Deutschland oder Preussen?’ [1922],
in Preuss, Staat, Recht und Freiheit, p. 453. See also Hugo Preuss, ‘Die Wandlung des
deutschen Kaisergedankens’ [1917], in ibid., pp. 273–89.
62 Preuss, ‘Weltkrieg, Demokratie und Deutschlands Erneuerung’, pp. 251–2.
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absolute veto against the most important forms of Reich law, of course not
openly in his capacity as Kaiser, but concealed in the Prussian votes in the
Bundesrat . . .’.63 Specific recent experience also lay behind the strict insis-
tence that all acts of the Kaiser, whether civil or military, should require coun-
tersignature by the relevant minister, as should the publication of oral
statements by the Kaiser on political matters. Indeed, Preuss wanted to speci-
fy that violation of the latter prescription should be treated as high treason.64
Ironically, Preuss called for this provision not long before a political crisis
confirmed the Kaiser’s loss of de facto power to military high command. Yet
the well-known and calamitous interventions before 1914 of the man whom
Max Weber had privately described as far back as 1892 as an ‘eccentrically
gifted lieutenant’ are all too clearly behind this very severe constitutional pro-
vision.65 From the 1896 Krüger telegram, supporting the Boers against Eng-
land, and the 1898 anti-strike prison speech through the Yellow Peril speech
of 1905, the Moroccan crises and the Daily Telegraph affair of 1908, the Kai-
ser had made a series of disastrous interventions. Preuss’s concern about the
publication of oral statements was entirely in tune with Max Weber’s exasper-
ation: ‘Again and again it was the publication of statements by the monarch
which created these politically quite useless and damaging sensations.’66
Preuss did not question the monarchical character of the Reich. To the con-
trary, he wanted to make this fact of German constitutional life more explicit.
But it was to be a limited, constitutional monarchy, at the heart of which was a
parliamentary government. The desire for transparency and an end to the
‘life-giving lies’ of the authoritarian state were nowhere more evident than in
Preuss’s suggestion for the revision of Article 21, which in its current form
specified that a member of parliament lost his seat on taking up paid govern-
ment office. Preuss wanted to exempt ministers from this provision on the
grounds that ‘The current stipulation is supposed to prevent deputies from
exploiting their mandates to pursue careers, though it has not achieved this
goal. The aspiration to implement his political convictions through govern-
ment is the natural duty of every deputy who does not want to merely talk.’67
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63 Hugo Preuss, ‘Vorschläge zur Abänderung der Reichsverfassung und der
Preussischen Verfassung, nebst Begründung’ [1917], in Preuss, Staat, Recht und
Freiheit, p. 304. Preuss explained that his draft was finished at the beginning of July
1917, before the ministerial crisis that had confirmed the discredit with which the Ger-
man system was viewed.
64 Ibid., p. 310.
65 For Weber’s description see Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, p. 141.
66 Max Weber, ‘Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political
Order’, in Weber. Political Writings, ed. Peter Laswell and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge,
1994), p. 201.
67 Preuss, ‘Vorschläge zur Abänderung der Reichsverfassung und der Preussischen
Verfassung’, p. 319. See also Weber’s complaint, ‘Parliament as a spring-board for the
careers of talented candidates for state-secretaryships: this characteristically bureau-
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That this was not only a matter of constitutional provision but also an essential
part of an active and effective parliamentary life was evident in another text of
the same year. There Preuss lamented the admission of one party leader that
his colleagues were looking forward to a return to their accustomed role in
opposition. His despair was palpable: ‘Yes, there it is. The natural condition
always appears to be that the authoritarian government alone can act; parlia-
mentary parties engage in negative criticism.’68
Preuss’s support for an elected head of state had little to do with an inability
to grasp the preconditions of democratic parliamentary government or linger-
ing sympathy for the traits of the Bismarckian system, all of which he
opposed. Preuss and his colleagues were faced with a limited number of pos-
sibilities. The first was a collegial head of state on the Swiss model. Once this
was rejected, the two models for the election of a president were the American
and French ones. The collegial option was viewed sympathetically by two
socialists, Max Quarck and Joseph Herzfeld, though Quarck admitted there
were advantages in a presidency.69 Preuss’s objection to this was quite differ-
ent from Weber’s more or less overt sympathy for a strong head of state.
Preuss feared rather ‘that each of the larger German states would claim a seat
in the directorate and would presumably be able to push through this claim’.70
Behind this concern lay Preuss’s opposition to the nefarious influence of the
Bundesrat, whose members were regarded as delegates of the states. That in
turn had been used by Prussia to consolidate its hegemony and to screen it
from accountability.71 Preuss argued, in fact, that his main reason for support-
ing a directly elected presidency was the lack of an alternative. Election by
cratic conception is advocated by political and juristic literati who find the solution to the
problem of German parliamentarianism in a specifically German manner. These are the
same circles which sneer at the supposedly only west European and specifically demo-
cratic “place hunting”.’ Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Tübingen, 1980),
p. 343.
68 Hugo Preuss, ‘Deutsche Demokratisierung’ [1917], in Preuss, Staat, Recht und
Freiheit, p. 343. See also his statement that ‘For a real opposition, capable of govern-
ment, is always the correlate of an effective parliamentary government’ (Hugo Preuss,
‘Die Improvisierung des Parlamentarismus’ [1918], in ibid., p. 363). See also Jasper
Mauersberg, Ideen und Konzeption Hugo Preuss’ für die Verfassung der deutschen
Republik 1919 und ihre Durchsetzung im Verfassungswerk im Weimar (Frankfurt am
Main, 1991), p. 42.
69 Max Quarck was a majority socialist, Joseph Herzfeld an independent socialist.
Quarck’s concession was that a president could be useful in the armistice negotiations
and the implementation of the planned socialization programme. The latter notion had
been raised, possibly disingenuously, by Max Weber. See Max Weber, ‘[Beiträge zur
Verfassungsfrage anlässlich der Verhandlungen im Reichsamt des Innern vom 9. Bis 12.
Dezember 1918]’, in Max Weber zur Neuordnung Deutschlands. Schriften und Reden,
ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Tübingen, 1988), pp. 82–3.
70 Ibid., p. 82.
71 See his early criticism in Preuss, ‘Deutschland und sein Reichskanzler gegenüber
dem Geist unserer Zeit’.
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parliament, the French model, was less democratic. He added a tactical con-
sideration: in parliament the ‘bourgeois parties’ were more likely to reach
agreement than the ‘strongly democratic’ ones.72 He had also employed
Redslob’s language to dismiss parliamentary election of the head of state as
characteristic of an ‘ungenuine parliamentary system’.73 Herzfeld’s fears,
similar to Redslob’s here, that a directly elected president would gain the
upper hand over parliament were countered with the reassurance that the pres-
ident’s position ‘would be made similar to that of a limited parliamentary
monarch’.74
In his public justification of this outcome, Preuss took up Redslob’s lan-
guage with greater vigour: ‘Genuine parliamentarianism assumes two essen-
tially co-equal [ebenbürtige] highest state organs . . .’, namely parliament and
president.75 Strictly, this equality was limited. Each had an autonomous
source of legitimacy and each had the right to put the actions of the other
before the people. The president could dissolve parliament and put parliamen-
tary legislation to a popular referendum. Parliament could put the president
and his record before the people, though if he survived this plebiscitary test it
would count as re-election. The business of government, including control of
the administration, however, was supposed to lie with the government, which
was responsible to parliament. This was not the only option, for Preuss could
have advocated the American model, vesting the business of government in
the presidency. Yet Preuss rejected the American model, for its inherent dual-
ism was all too familiar to Germany. According to Preuss, in the American
system ‘parliament was . . . limited to abstract legislation, to criticism and
negation, impotent in the face of the administration, which really determined
the practicalities of life’.76 For Preuss it was vital that ‘the real leadership of
the Reich administration lies publicly and clearly in the hands of the govern-
ment, which is politically responsible to the parliament’.77 Preuss rejected the
American model because he believed, not implausibly, that it would have per-
petuated the old vices of the Reich. Preuss’s arguments about the presidency
were clear responses to the problems of German political life. They were
responses intended to strengthen the power of parliament and to prevent polit-
ical paralysis. In brief, Preuss had good democratic arguments for what he
advocated and Redslob was a useful source of rhetorical support.
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72 Preuss, ‘[Beiträge zur Verfassungsfrage anlässlich der Verhandlungen im
Reichsamt des Innern vom 9. Bis 12. Dezember 1918]’, p. 86.
73 Ibid., p. 84.
74 Ibid.
75 Preuss, ‘Denkschrift zum Entwurf des allgemeinen Teils der Reichsverfassung
vom 3. Januar 1919’ [1919], in Preuss, Staat, Recht und Freiheit, p. 387.
76 Ibid., p. 386.
77 Ibid., p. 393. At the same time Preuss fought for self-government at the local level,
albeit unsuccessfully. See Siegfried Grassmann, Hugo Preuss und die deutsche
Selbstverwaltung (Lübeck, 1965), pp. 119–20.
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Yet Preuss knew all along that constitutional provision alone was not suffi-
cient. So far as he had been able, he had helped to create a ‘differentiation of
the legally normativized and organized expression of the common will
through a plurality of organs’.78 But this did not guarantee that the ever-
changing common will would prove equal to the challenges he knew it would
face. Indeed, Preuss had known all along that the challenges facing Germany
were enormous. The established Western parliamentary democracies had
benefited from a period in which parliamentary practices had been established
on a far from democratic basis. This plutocratic or aristocratic
parliamentarianism had been built upon a relatively homogenous social basis.
Subsequent democratization, along with the heightened class conflict of
industrialized society, took place against the background of established par-
liamentary institutions. In Germany there had been no such preparation, ‘only
a fairly weak and highly unorganized constitutional insertion into the surviv-
ing authoritarian system [Obrigkeitssystem]’.79 The split between the social-
ists and the ‘bourgeois’ parties aggravated the situation. It was true that even
in the established parliamentary democracies this division was a challenge to
the political system, but in Germany the consequences were more perilous,
‘for in the absence of an active sense of citizenship, authoritarianism [die
Obrigkeit] offers itself as the supposedly sole unpolitical third element to the
contending social forces’. Preuss added, ‘In reality, of course, the authoritar-
ian government floats in a socially empty space just as little as politically it
can really “stand above parties”.’80 The exigencies of war and the defeat of
Germany were further obstacles. The propaganda of Germany’s wartime ene-
mies played into the hands of German opponents of democracy, who could
argue that the Allied goal was ‘not the democratization or subjection of Ger-
many but rather the subjection of Germany through its democratization’.81
Then, of course, there was Versailles, which induced Preuss himself to resign.
Preuss soon had reason for concern as President Ebert resorted to decrees
under Article 48. But worrying though this was, it was not the constitutional
power of the president that was the biggest problem. It was the persistence of
conceptions of the power of the state that long pre-dated the Weimar Repub-
lic. In October 1923 Preuss protested: ‘One speaks continually of a military or
78 Preuss, ‘Über Organpersönlichkeit’, p. 135.
79 Preuss, ‘Deutsche Demokratisierung’, p. 342.
80 Ibid., p. 343. It was precisely this dilemma that bedevilled the efforts of the last
three chancellors of the Weimar Republic, Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen and Kurt
von Schleicher. See Hans Mommsen, ‘State and Bureaucracy in the Brüning Era’ and
‘Heinrich Brüning as Chancellor’, both in Hans Mommsen, From Weimar to Auschwitz
(Princeton, 1991), pp. 79–118 and 119–40. Ironically, these men did not use Prussia as a
bastion of power, and one of them, Franz von Papen, put an end to Prussian independ-
ence. The myth of Prussia, however, lived on and it was left to the Allied powers of the
Second World War finally to fulfil Preuss’s ambition of breaking up Prussia.
81 Preuss, ‘Deutsche Demokratisierung’, p. 339.
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civil state of emergency [Ausnahmezustand]. Article 48.2 of the Constitution
recognizes no state of emergency or siege in general, and absolutely no kind
of military [state of emergency or siege].’82 Hugo Preuss died on 9 October
1925 before the apparent triumph of those ideas. How different they were
from his ideas is evident in the motivation behind the dissolution of the
Reichstag in 1930, which led to the September 1930 elections and the elec-
toral breakthrough of the National Socialists. The dissolution followed parlia-
mentary rejection of a presidential decree implementing the policy of
Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. According to Foreign Minister Julius Curtius,
Brüning acted ‘to protect the President’s authority after it had been threatened
by the nullification of the decrees’.83 Constitutionally this was nonsense. The
Reichstag had acted within its powers. Brüning, however, presumed that the
president possessed an authority that was infringed precisely by such consti-
tutional exercise of power. He presumed an authority that had less to do with
plebiscitary legitimacy than with the autochthonous power of the state which
Bismarck had invoked in the constitutional crisis of 1862 to 1866. This was an
authority that had no connection with the ideas of Hugo Preuss. It was what he
had fought against all his life. The dissolution has been aptly described by
Lehnert as a ‘political punishment’.84 As such, it was, at best, precisely that
abuse of power about which Redslob had complained.
Insofar as the Weimar Republic was Preuss’s work, and it was so only to a
limited extent, it failed not because of him but despite him. It failed not
because one of the principal authors of its constitution remained trapped in a
monarchist or pseudo-democratic conceptual world, but because his ideas did
not find sufficiently fertile ground. To force Preuss into the framework of a
tradition marked by the authoritarianism of the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine
political systems underestimates the complexity of German political thought
at the time. It is to go further even than Preuss’s and Weimar’s contemporary
critics, who at least recognized the democratic credentials of both the man and
the constitution, if only to denounce both as un-German.
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82 Quoted in Lehnert, Die Weimarer Republik, p. 276.
83 Quoted in Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, Vol. 2 (New York,
1963), p. 271.
84 Lehnert, Die Weimarer Republik, p. 197.
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